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UNIFORM, UNIFORMED AND UNITARY LAWS
REGULATING CONSUMER CREDIT
CARL FELSENFELD*
I. THE UNiFOPm CONSUMER CREDIT CODE AND THE FEDERAL
CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
THE spring and summer of 1968 witnessed two major statutory events
affecting consumer credit. In June, Congress and the President en-
acted the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act1 (CCPA), generally
referred to throughout its gestation in terms of its major subject, "Truth
in Lending."' 2 Following this, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association, at their respective annual meetings in Philadelphia,
approved as a "uniform" law the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(UCCC).1 These two legislative works may have an eventual impact on
consumer credit to rival the invention of the time price doctrine and the
drafting of the first Uniform Small Loan Law.' It will not be our object
to cover all the substantive details of the two statutes.5 Rather, we shall
examine the major ideas underlying their construction, their significant
interdependencies and, most important, their place in our federal system.
The UCCC and the CCPA were each drafted in full knowledge of the
other. Of the two, the UCCC is far more comprehensive. Begun as a
* Member of the New York Bar; Consultant to the Special Committee of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws which drafted the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code.
1. Public Law 90-321 (May 29, 1968), 82 Stat. 146 [hereinafter cited as CCPA].
2. Actually, Article 1 of the CCPA which deals with disclosure requirements is itself
titled "The Truth in Lending Act." The designation nevertheless is generally used for the
entire CCPA.
3. Approval by the Commissioners was on July 30, 1968 and by the ABA on August 7,
1968.
4. It was essentially the combination of these two devices that permitted the creation
and growth of widespread consumer credit. This would not have been possible if this type
of credit had been subject to the limitations of the traditional usury lams. The Uniform
Small Loan Law developed in 1916 from the discovery of the Russell Sage Foundation that
unduly low rate ceilings hurt the consumer by restricting legitimate credit and forcing the
consumer into the hands of the loan-sharks. See W. M1ors, Consumer Credit Finance
Charges 9-19 (1965). The time price doctrine served a like purpose for instalment selling.
See note 44 infra.
5. Details of the UCCC may be found in a number of other articles, including Jordan
& Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 387 (1968); Moo, The
Final Tentative Draft of a Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 34 Ind. Banker 8 (June,
1968; Robinson, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, A New Way of Life for the Con-
sumer Loan Industry, 22 Pers. Fin. L.Q. Rep. 118 (1968).
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formal project in 19630 through the appointment of a special commit-
tee by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the UCCC is designed
as a sweeping and detailed statute governing virtually all aspects of
consumer credit. It replaces state usury laws insofar as those laws relate
to loans or other forms of credit 7 and establishes a comprehensive sys-
tem regulating consumer credit sales, loans, revolving credit, including
the various credit card plans as well as traditional vendor charge ac-
counts and revolving bank credit, and the related areas of administration,
licensing, insurance, remedies and penalties. Plans and preliminary
drafts have also been formulated to add major articles dealing with the
conduct of credit counseling and debt pro-rating activities as well as a
possible state wage earner receivership to supplement Chapter XIII of
the Bankruptcy Act.8 While the major emphasis of the UCCC is clearly
on consumer credit, certain low-balance business or commercial credit
transactions, principally in the area of under-$25,000 credits extended
to individuals, are also treated. It was the position of many consumer
interests that the small proprietorship required as much protection as
the individual consumer.
The CCPA is much narrower in scope. It will soon, however, be the
law of the land9 while the UCCC has yet to be submitted to a state
legislature. The CCPA is in four titles. The first and most significant
contains the highly publicized requirement that the cost of credit be
disclosed in terms of simple annual interest.10 However, only consumer
and agricultural" credit transactions, not credit for commercial pur-
poses, are covered and even these are excluded, for other than real estate
transactions, if the amount of credit exceeds $25,000.12 The form of the
transaction is not material; loans, sales and the various forms of re-
6. Buerger, Project on Retail Instalment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury,
18 Pers. Fin. L.Q. Rep. 110 (1964).
7. In addition to credit transactions, state usury laws also apply to unpaid judgments,
notes and other cases where there is no agreed rate or no agreement is possible. Where the
UCCC occasions the repeal of such statutes, a specific replacement must be made for these
purposes. See Note to UCCC § 9.103.
8. I was official consultant to the Special Committee on these subjects and suffered
the indignity of seeing Articles 7 and 8 of the UCCC "Reserved for Future Use." The fact
was that these two subjects proved surprisingly controversial and a decision, the correct
one, was made not to risk losing the entire UCCC due to battles over two articles that
were not, after all, absolutely essential to its purpose.
9. All of the CCPA except Chapters 2 and 3 of Title I (disclosure) and Title III (gar-
nishment) took effect upon enactment. The disclosure requirements become effective July 1,
1969 and Title III becomes effective July 1, 1970. CCPA § 504.
10. See CCPA §§ 127, 128, 129.
11. See CCPA § 103(h).
12. CCPA § 104(3).
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volving credit are all subject to the CCPA. In addition to rate, other
significant financial aspects of the transactions such as the total dollar
cost of the credit, the schedule of payments, the charges for delinquency
and prepayment penalties must be disclosed. Advertising of credit trans-
actions is also made subject to provisions of the CCPA. Most signifi-
cantly, an advertisement for credit may not state any one significant
aspect of a credit transaction, such as downpayment or amount of
charge, without also disclosing a prescribed additional series of items,
including the simple annual interest rate.' 3
Title II of the CCPA makes extortionate credit transactions, whether
consumer or commercial, a federal crime. As the Act was designed
principally to combat "organized crime,"' 4 usury as such, i.e., merely
charging an illegal rate of interest, is not criminal.1 The criminal act is
the understanding between the creditor and the debtor that failure to
make repayment "could result in the use of violence or other criminal
means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any per-
son."' 6 Title III restricts the garnishment of earnings withheld for pay-
ment of a debt (any debt, not necessarily one for consumer credit) to
25 percent of disposable (after tax) earnings or 30 times the amount
by which disposable earnings for a week exceed the federal minimum
hourly wage, whichever is less. Title IV creates a National Commission
on Consumer Finance to "study and appraise the functioning and struc-
ture of the consumer finance industry, as well as consumer credit trans-
actions generally.'1 7
In two areas the CCPA recognizes the particular adaptability and
traditional role of state rather than federal supervision over certain sub-
jects and specifically defers to adequate state legislation when present.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which gen-
erally administers Title I ("Truth in Lending") of the CCPA, may by
regulation exempt from this Title transactions which are subject to
state law with "requirements substantially similar" to the federal re-
quirements.18 Similarly, the Secretary of Labor, who has primary
responsibility for Title III (Garnishment) may exempt from the CCPA
garnishments under "substantially similar" state laws.' 9 The Special
Committee of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, a state-
13. See CCPA § 144.
14. See CCPA § 201.
15. The charging of more than 45 percent per annum may, however, assist in the estab-
lishment of a prima fade case. See CCPA § 892.
16. CCPA § 891(6).
17. CCPA § 404.
18. CCPA § 123.
19. CCPA § 305.
1968]
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oriented group appointed by state governors,20 and vitally interested in
retaining maximum state dominion over credit transactions, reacted pre-
dictably to both these Federal invitations. The UCCC contains provi-
sions drafted with careful regard for the CCPA21 that the Federal
Reserve Board and the Secretary of Labor will be hard put to find sub-
stantially dissimilar to the analogous disclosure and garnishment sections
of the CCPA, at least in the absence of regulations interpreting those
sections. As of this writing, regulations under the CCPA have not been
written. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has
been accorded extremely broad regulatory powers to interpret, and even
grant exceptions from, the CCPA.2 In its final resolution approving the
UCCC, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws gave to its Special
Committee on the UCCC authority to revise the Act after the regula-
tions appear, in order to retain its "substantial similarity" to the CCPA.
It is anticipated that state legislatures, in jealous regard for maximum
state sovereignty, will find this ability to supplant federal law a signifi-
cant stimulant to passage of the UCCC.
The patterns of the CCPA and the UCCC suggest three different legis-
lative approaches to a problem: (1) The uniform law is designed for
passage by all states. Through separate and independent state action,
one law will become the law of the land. (2) The federal law accom-
plishes the same result through central, unitary action. (3) The federal
law also is designed to influence the states to pass comparable legislation
that will, pursuant to the terms of the federal law, displace that law.
Therefore, state law is, through a kind of gentle central coercion, being
"uniformed." We shall explore later some similarities of these three de-
vices.
II. THE CLIMATE THAT FORCED LEGISLATION
The laws and judicial doctrines that now govern the field of consumer
credit are in obvious need of overhauling. Created at various times in
response to various problems, there exists a confusing and often incon-
sistent tangle of laws to bedevil the lawyer and, in all probability, com-
pletely elude the consumer. A national consumer finance company
lending in all states probably will deal with over 70 statutes controlling
loans, the applicable one at any time depending upon such factors as
the amount of the loan, the rate, the purpose of the transaction, the class
of collateral and the type of borrower. If this company also wishes to
20. N.Y. Exec. Law § 165 (Supp. 1968).
21. Part 3 of both Articles 2 and 3 of the UCCC contain a provision actually tying the
UCCC disclosures of the CCPA.
22. See CCPA § 105.
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engage in the allied business of financing retail sales through acquiring
("discounting") instalment sale contracts from dealers in goods and
services, it will probably have to contend in addition with about 50 sales
finance statutes. If it wishes to engage in financing through the medium
of the credit card, it will find, not a plethora, but a dearth of guiding
law.
Take New York State as an example. Credit is now available princi-
pally under the following laws and doctrines:
1. The General Usury Law.' Recently raised from the hallowed six
percent per annum to a rate set by the New York Banking Board at
between five and 7.5 percent,2- this is the foundation for all credit trans-
actions. To the best of the author's knowledge, no consumer credit of
any commercial significance is granted under the six percent ceiling.
Even real estate mortgages at rates nominally six percent or lower were
boosted to higher yields through use of the "point" system.2 It was,
indeed, the problems inherent in using points, particularly the danger
that they might be considered as illegal interest, that really resulted in
New York's new usury law.
2. The Small Loan Law.26 Under licenses extremely difficult to obtain
and sparingly issued 27 by the Department of Banking, loans may be
made in the maximum amount of $800 at rates which vary from the
equivalent of about 30 percent per annum for loans of $100 and less to
about 19 percent per annum for the maximum loan of $800, assuming
that they are repayable in equal monthly instalments.
3. New York State Banks and Trust Companies. When specially
certificated, New York State banks and trust companies may make in-
stalment repayment loans at a maximum "discount" rate of six percent.28
This, when applied to the face amount of a note repayable in consecu-
tive monthly instalments, a practice sanctioned by the statute, translates
into actuarial rates which depend upon the term of the loan: for ex-
23. N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law § 5-501.
24. N.Y. Banking Law, as amended by addition of § 14-a, ch. 349, § 3 (19681 N.Y.
Acts 599. By regulation No. 37, dated June 21, 1968, the Banking Board set a 7.25 percent
rate to be effective until the earlier of (a) a new maximum set by the Board or (b) Septem-
ber 21, 1971.
25. Frank Wille, New York State Superintendent of Banks, was quoted in The New
York Times, Nov. 10, 1967, at 71, col. 1, as saying: "[Tihe point is neither higher interest
rates nor lower interest rates, but a realistic flexibility. . . ." Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-319
(Supp. 1968) specifically includes points as interest. The CCPA, § 106(a)(1), also includes
points as part of the finance charge to be disclosed.
26. N.Y. Banking Law art. 9.
27. See Supervisory Circular Letter LL-15 of the State of New York Banking Depart-
ment, Nov. 28, 1966.
28. N.Y. Banking Law § 108(4) (Supp. 1968).
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ample, 11.5 percent for a 12 month loan and 13.4 percent for a 36 month
loan. National Banks are accorded authority under the National Bank-
ing Act to lend at the same rate authorized for state banks under ap-
plicable state law, thus indirectly tying national banking associations
located in New York to the limitations of the New York Banking Law. 0
4. New York State Credit Unions. These institutions are specially
authorized to lend to their members at a rate of one percent per month
(approximately 12 percent per year actuarially) or, alternatively, at a
six percent discount computed in the manner accorded to state banks."°
Federal credit unions are restricted to a one percent per month rate. 1
As there are more than 23,000 credit unions in the United States with
close to 20 million members, this is not an inconsiderable segment of the
potential credit market.32
5. Retail Instalment Sales Act. Sellers of most goods except auto-
mobiles and those who provide services on time for non-commercial pur-
poses are subject to the Retail Instalment Sales Act."8 This statute
restricts finance charge rates, on an "add-on" basis,84 to $10 per $100
per annum for balances up to $500 and $8 per $100 per annum on the
excess.35 This translates into actuarial rates of about 18 percent for a
$500 sale payable in 12 equal monthly instalments and rates on higher
balances that approach 15 percent as the balances rise. In New York,
the Retail Instalment Sales Act also controls the charges that may be
imposed upon an ordinary department store charge account.", This is
not a typical provision; the legal classification to be given charge ac-
counts in many states (are they really time sales or loans made by the
stores to their customers?) is in considerable doubt. Much turns on this
classification. 7
6. Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales Act. Sellers of motor vehi-
cles in New York are not covered by the Retail Instalment Sales Act,
29. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1964).
30. N.Y. Banking Law § 453(5) (a).
31. 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5) (1964).
32. Modley, Credit Unions, 34 Ind. Banker 11 (July, 1968).
33. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 401.
34. This means that the charge, if a contract is payable in equal monthly instalments,
is computed on, and added to, the opening balance without regard to the constantly dimin-
ishing balance. A one year $500 credit at a io add-on rate would bear a charge of $50
($10 per $100 per year) and be repayable in 12 instalments of about $45.84 each. If the
payment schedule is irregular a more complex computation is required to obtain an equiva-
lent yield.
35. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 404(1) (a) (b).
36. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 413.
37. See Driver, Retail Revolving Credit and the Usury Statutes, 20 Pers. Fin. L.Q. Rep.
24 (1965).
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but by the separate Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales Act.38 As
with the former Act, the latter also excludes sales for commercial pur-
poses. Maximum rates of finance charges in the Motor Vehicle Act are
based upon the age of the vehicle and vary from $7 to $13 "add-on," '
or simple interest equivalents of from 12.8 percent to 22.8 percent for
the relatively typical three year automobile sale contract.
7. Banking Law. Those business organizations which finance con-
sumer instalment sales by buying or "discounting" obligations from the
original sellers of goods and services, thereby indirectly making con-
sumer credit available, must be specially licensed under the Banking
Law.40 Rates are not controlled by this statute.
8. Loans to Corporations. Loans to corporations are not subject to
any interest ceiling under a special amendment to the general usury
laws.4' Some variation on the general interest limitation permitting
corporations to borrow without a rate ceiling or subject to higher ceilings
than individuals exists in over 40 states. The theory behind this is di-
rectly related to the commercial exceptions from the Retail Instalment
Sales Acts already noted: commercial entities are presumably able to
take better care of themselves than ordinary individuals and, therefore,
need less statutory protection. 42
9. The Time Price Doctrine. Credit charges on sales for commercial
or business purposes, excluded from the two Instalment Sales Acts, made
to individuals or partnerships, might be considered subject to usury law
ceiling but for the "time price doctrine." The rationale of this doctrine
is that a seller of goods or services, subject to anti-trust law, may sell
at whatever price he wishes.' He may have one price for buyers who
wish to pay cash and another, higher price, to those who wish to pay over
a period of time. The differential between the two is not interest; the
transaction is not a loan at all and is therefore not subject to any usury
38. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law art. 9.
39. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 303.
40. N.Y. Banking Law art. 11-B (Supp. 1968). Original sellers of motor vehicles who
regularly hold instalment sale contracts aggregating $25,000 or more must also be so licensed.
41. N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law § 5-521. It is even permissible in New York to incorpo-
rate for the purpose of utilizing this exemption. Mfargulis v. Messinger, 34 Misc. 2d 699,
210 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1960). This is not always the case in other states. See In re
Greenberg, 21 N.J. 213, 121 A.2d 520 (1956); cf. Momnouth Capital Corp. v. Holmdel
Village Shops, Inc., 92 N.J. Super. 480, 224 A.2d 35 (Super. Ct. 1966).
42. This theory is part of the CCPA which exempts commercial transactions. To a lesser
degree it is also part of the UCCC which does include commercial transactions, mainly if
with individuals and below $25,000. See UCCC §§ 2.602, 3.602.
43. The development of this pricing system, a combination of religious and economic
policies, is described in R. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (2d ed. 1937).
1968]
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law or other form of rate ceiling in New York.14 The "time price doc-
trine," once the vehicle for financing almost all credit sales, has dimin-
ished in importance as consumer sales became increasingly subject to
various specialized statutes like the two New York Instalment Sales
Acts and, for commercial transactions, corporations became exempt from
state usury laws. It nevertheless continues vital to the existence of many
areas of financing in many states. It has also, as we shall see, played a
significant role in the structure of the UCCC.4"
New York is chosen for these illustrations not because it is unique,
but because it is representative. Some other states have even more com-
plex patterns. Just in the states bordering New York we find such addi-
tional examples as: no usury law at all for many consumer as well as
business loans; 46 laws governing the credit sale of goods, but not ser-
vices; 4 laws specially governing loans secured by second mortgages on
land;"4 laws specially governing the time sale of improvements upon real
property; 49 and overlapping statutes providing special rates for licensed
lenders.5 0 If we took the space to wander farther geographically, the
various statutory devices would increase equivalently." This little com-
parative survey is also made without regard to a relatively specialized
group of recently enacted state statutes which relate particularly to dis-
closure in credit transactions and about which we shall have more to say.
One result of this statutory proliferation is a continuing question about
which statute controls any given transaction. Many of the regulatory
statutes contain sizable "exemption" sections listing the transactions
they are intended not to cover and which fall under some related super-
visory provision. 2 Transactions identical in form, i.e., a loan by a bank,
44. Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861); Flatbush Auto Discount Corp. v.
McCarthy-Bernhardt Buick, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 776, 215 N.Y.S.2d 78, 174 N.E.2d 749 (1961);
Brooks v. Avery, 4 N.Y. 225 (1850). This doctrine is recognized in all states except
Arkansas, Sloan v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1957); Hare v.
General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952). See generally War-
ren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Instalment Sales, 68 Yale L.J. 839 (1959).
45. See notes 135-39 infra.
46. In Massachusetts, loans above $3000 have no interest cap except if secured by a
home mortgage. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 140, § 90A (1965).
47. Retail Instalment Sales Act, N.J. Rev. Stat. § 17:16C-1 (Supp. 1967).
48. Secondary Mortgage Loan, Business Act, NJ. Rev. Stat. § 17:11A (Supp. 1967).
49. Retail Instalment Sales Act, N.J. Rev. Stat. § 17:16C-62 (Supp. 1967).
50. Small Loan Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 7, § 6151 (1967); Consumer Discount Company
Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 7, § 6203 (1967).
51. See Benfield, Money, Mortgages and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 819, 835-852 (1968).
52. E.g., Consumer Finance Act, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 74, § 38 (Smith-Hurd 1966); Small
Loan Act, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 18-3005 (1964); Small Loan Business Act, N.J. Rev. Stat.
§ 17:10-22 (1963); Small Loan Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 7, § 6157 (1967).
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a credit union or licensed lender, now fall within entirely separate stat-
utes and appropriate statutory fencings must be provided to sustain the
distinctions. In addition, as new forms of consumer credit develop, sig-
nificant questions regularly arise concerning whether or not they fit
within any existing statutory control. One example of this is the tradi-
tional department store revolving credit plan: the "charge account."
Another is the credit card in its many forms. 3 If these two transactional
forms basically represent sales on time and the "discounting" or fi-
nancing of those sales with some form of credit agency, a series of re-
sults follow.' Most significantly, if they are "sales" they are not "loans"
and, therefore, the usury laws do not applyY Almost as important, for
reasons more historic than economic, lender credit has generally been
much more highly regulated than seller credit. Those who sell goods or
services on time are very rarely required to obtain licenses as financing
agencies. Lenders also more generally require licenses than finance agen-
cies which discount the accounts created by sellers and thereby actually
fund seller credit; even when seller credit is subject to licensing require-
ments, the licenses are invariably easier to get than those required for
lenders.56 Specific statutes can be, and have been, drafted for these
special purposes.57 The UCCC and the CCPA also give specific treat-
ment to these devices, the UCCC classifying them, depending upon their
use, within either loan or sale categories.', Without such detailed con-
trolling legislation, however, much turns on the legal classification the
transactions will receive and as yet there is no general agreement.
An obvious variation on these problems is the issue of interstate trans-
actions. Lenders and other grantors of consumer credit regularly do
53. South, Credit Cards: A Primer, 23 Bus. Law 327 (1968); Board of Governors, The
Federal Reserve System, Bank Credit-Card and Check-Credit Plans, July, 1968.
54. For a tax effect, see Schneer's, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 247 F. Supp. 990 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
55. In Massachusetts, credit cards have been held sales and not loans. Uni-Serv Corp. v.
Commissioner of Banks, 349 Mass. 283, 207 N.E.2d 906 (1965). The problem remains, how-
ever, in the remaining states. See South, supra note 53.
To the effect that revolving credit accounts might be considered usurious loans, see 54
Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 235 (1965). On credit cards, Op. Ore. Att'y Gen. No. 6520 (1967).
56. As one from among the many examples available, a seller finance company in New
York licenses under art. IX of the Banking Law which essentially contains no specific pre-
requisites to the granting of a license. Small loan companies, on the other hand, cannot
obtain a license until, under N.Y. Banking Law § 343, they can prove that it "will promote
the convenience and advantage of the community in which the business of the applicant
is to be conducted." This is extremely difficult to do.
57. Credit cards are specifically regulated under some statutes: Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 97
(1967); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 413.
58. UCCC § 1-301(8)(15). Since the UCCC treats these specifically, the label "sale" or
"loan" is of considerably diminished importance.
1968]
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business in more than one state. Similarly, the mobility of the debtor
class constantly increases. It is not unusual for a resident of state X to
borrow from a lender in state Y, either by physically going to Y, by cor-
responding through the mails or by appearing for the first loan and
corresponding for subsequent loans. A lender operating under a favor-
able statute in Y might find borrowers utilizing its services through the
mails not only from X, but from states B, F and W. Similarly, a store
in Y may sell to X residents on time. A single credit card might be used
in all states."9
The efforts of states to protect themselves and their residents from
the laws of other states, inconsistent with their own, are burgeoning.
Probably the most significant recent case, People v. Fairfax Family
Fund6° prevented a Kentucky lender from continuing a broadside solici-
tation of loans in California without licensing under the latter's laws.
The case raised a major issue of whether California's requirement that
the lender be licensed in California did not create an unconstitutional
burden upon interstate commerce-an issue decided against the lender.0
A number of states have enacted statutes regulating loans made to their
residents, even if those loans are made entirely in other states,0 2 or af-
fecting the enforceability of any loan, wherever made. 3 This type of
statute raises a number of significant issues concerning due process and
a state's degree of power to burden interstate commerce, and federal full
faith and credit requirements-issues that are generally resolved to sus-
tain the state legislation. 4
59. The issues of conflicts of laws applied to credit transactions are extremely complex
and generally beyond the scope of this article. Controlling law could be based upon: the
location of goods sold in a credit transaction, H. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 153 (3d ed.
1949); the place of contracting, 1956 U. Ill. L.F. 633; the place of performance, Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Proposed Official Draft, Part 2 § 195 (1968); or a
more modem policy type of approach could be established. Cheatham & Reese, Choice
of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 959 (1952). Another doctrine generally applied
in the area of loans is that the law of the jurisdiction which sustains rather than one which
invalidates a transaction will be applied. Note, Conflict of Laws: "Party Autonomy" in
Contracts, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 553 (1957).
60. 235 Cal. App. 2d 881, 47 Cal. Rptr. 812 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964), appeal dismissed, 382
U.S. 1 (1965) (per curiam).
61. See Fairfax Family Fund v. California, 382 U.S. 1 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
62. Robertson v. Burnett, 172 Neb. 385, 109 N.W.2d 716 (1961); Del. Code Ann. tit. 5,
§ 2111 (1953); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1321.17 (1953); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.52.010
(1961).
63. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-243 (Supp. 1968); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 516.18(3) (1962);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 229 (Supp. 1967).
64. James, The Effects of Federal Due Process of Law and Full Faith and Credit
Limitations on a Forum State Using Its Public Policy to Negate Parties' Autonomy in the
Validity of Conflict-of-Laws Contracts, 41 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1, 147 (1964). See also Ox-
ford Consumer Disc. Co. v. Stefanelli, No. A-469-67 (Super. Ct. N.J., Sept. 11, 1968).
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Rate disclosure, the core of the CCPA, has had a particularly varie-
gated treatment at the state legislative level. Virtually all statutes that
do more in the way of regulating consumer credit practices than the
typical general interest or usury laws contain some form of disclosure
requirement. Usually, such a requirement will appear in the local retail
instalment sales act, the small loan law and other comparable statutes.
Almost all of these require that the dollar cost of the credit be separately
stated. 5 That is, the debtor under these statutes will know the actual
dollar cost of the credit (usually assuming he pays his obligations when
they are due), but not necessarily its rate in percentage terms. Most
statutes regulating seller credit, the retail instalment sales acts, as con-
trasted with laws regulating loan credit, contain only this requirement in
disclosing credit charges.
Many statutes do, however, also require a statement of the interest
rate. Often a state's small loan law, as contrasted with its instalment
sales act, will contain such a provision.6 However, these statutes do not
begin to achieve uniformity even among themselves since, either by
specific language or the general context in which the requirement falls,
the rate disclosure may be satisfied by disclosing the interest rate in any
one of several ways.67 Add-on, discount and percent-per-month are the
three major forms of rate disclosure in addition to the generally ac-
cepted simple annual interest."" A consumer attempting to comparison-
shop among alternative financing vehicles might, under these statutes,
be forced to select among the $8 add-on offered by an appliance dealer,
1 percent per month from the credit union, $6 discount from the bank
and a revolving charge account based upon 1 percent of outstanding
balances on the last day of a month.
The movement that has culminated in the simple interest disclosure
requirements of the UCCC and the CCPA does have several existing
counterparts on the state level. 9 Stemming largely from the publicity
given to the work of Senator Douglas, succeeded in his work by Senator
Proxmire, to require this form of disclosure in all credit transactions,
some states were successful in enacting interest disclosure legislation
while the federal government wallowed in hearings and investigations."0
65. E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:16C-27 (1963); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 402(7).
66. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:10-15(a) (1963); N.Y. Banking Law § 353 (Supp. 196S).
67. While not a typical formulation, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 45-501 (Supp. 1967) specifically
permits the percent rate of charge to be stated in any of three different ways. Other options
appear in Hawaii Rev. Laws §§ 191A-1, 191A-2 (Supp. 1963) and N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 399-B:2 (1968).
68. See pages 213, 214 and 215, supra.
69. For a general discussion of disclosure requirements and theories, see Jordan &
Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1285 (1966).
70. See Truth in Lending-1967, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institu-
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To some degree these statutes all have individual idiosyncrasies but all,
in some way, require the disclosure of simple annual interest. Washing-
ton and Pennsylvania related their requirements only to retail consumer
(not commercial) sales. Pennsylvania only requires a statement that the
rate not exceed 15 percent simple interest; 71 Washington requires a rate
to be stated by the creditor above which the actual rate charged will not
rise.7" Neither Pennsylvania nor Washington require this form of dis-
closure for loans made in their states. Eight other states have enacted
statutes requiring simple interest disclosures for loan credit and, to vary-
ing degrees, sale credit.73 Most of these statutes are patterned in gen-
eral after the CCPA, despite the fact that all of them become effective
on or before the effective date of the CCPA and some before drafting of
the CCPA was even completed. Unfortunately, and of course a typical
product of non-uniform state legislation, all of these statutes vary to
greater or lesser degrees among themselves. Some, Connecticut, Maine,
New York, Rhode Island and Virginia, regulate only consumer and not
business transactions; some, Kentucky and Vermont, cover only loans
and not sales; some, Connecticut, Kentucky and Maine, require that
simple interest be shown under the "constant ratio" method and the re-
mainder under the "actuarial" method,74 unless, in Kentucky the admin-
istrator decides otherwise. There are many other variations among these
statutes.
To sum up, as of the approval of the UCCC by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners and the passage of the CCPA, there was little
uniformity in the national pattern of laws affecting consumer credit. If
uniformity was desirable, the federal system allowed for it either through
voluntary, individual state effort or through passage of federal legis-
lation.
tions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Com-
parisons of the state and federal legislative processes appear id. at 181.
71. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, §§ 1101-2303 (Supp. 1967).
72. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 63.14.040 (Supp. 1967).
73. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-357 (Supp. 1967); Ky. Acts 1968, ch. 188; Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 3851-57, tit. 9, §§ 3801-10 (Supp. 1968); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 140A,
§§ 1-11, ch. 255C, §§ 1, 13, ch. 255D, §§ 1, 9, 13, 17, 21, 23, 27, 29, ch. 255B, §§ 14A, 16,
20A, 20B (1967); N.Y. Laws 1968, ch. 1072; R.I. Laws 1968, H.B. 1086; Vt. Laws 1968,
H.B. 318; Va. Laws 1968 ch. 438.
74. Both are methods of showing simple annual interest. The "interest ratio" method,
however, assumes that the ratio of each individual payment which is interest and principal
is constant. The "actuarial" method assumes that each payment is applied first to unearned
interest accrued to the time of payment and the remainder to the reduction of principal.
The actuarial method is sometimes called the U.S. rule because of Story v. Livingston,
38 U.S. (12 Pet.) 359 (1839), and is the method adopted by the UCCC and the CCPA.
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III. THE CASE FOR UNIFORMITY
Eventually, the CCPA will almost certainly end most variations in
interest rate disclosure. This will not, however, be because the CCPA, as
the law of the land, will prescribe that disclosure. As we have pointed
out, the CCPA does not affect the existing scope of state law.7" Thus,
to the extent that a state statute does vary from the CCPA, it remains
effective. There will be two forces, however, stemming from the CCPA
that will result in the reduction, if not elimination, of these differences.
First, while compliance with most state disclosure statutes will not
necessarily be compliance with the CCPA, since, for example, a state
may now permit only the dollar amount of interest charge to be shown
or may permit the rate to be expressed as add-on, discount or percent-
per-month,7" compliance with the CCPA will automatically result in
satisfying the requirements of many state disclosure laws." We may,
therefore, anticipate that creditors, simply for reasons of convenience,
will select the form of disclosure that effects the maximum degree of
federal and state compliance. This logical business decision must of itself
result in a diminished amount of state-by-state variation.
The second force is, of course, the specific provision in the CCPA that
the Federal Reserve Board shall exempt from the CCPA disclosure re-
quirements any class of transactions subject to "substantially similar"
state requirements. 8 One may confidently expect that this invitation to
the states to supplant federal law with their own will not be taken
lightly. One may also confidently expect that the UCCC in its final form
will be held equivalent by the Federal Reserve Board to the CCPA."
To the extent that the states are impelled by this and other reasons to
adopt the UCCC, the benefits of uniformity will be visited upon us and
the actual uniforming implement will be state legislation.
Precisely what these benefits are is a subject to which insufficient
attention has been directed. Particularly in the more recent treatments
of unification of law, the concept seems to be accepted almost as a self-
evident good. A recent symposium on the subject devoted over 200 pages
to uniformity without a serious suggestion that the value of uniformity
75. CCPA § 111, assuming the state statute is not inconsistent.
76. Notes 66-68 supra.
77. CCPA §§ 128 and 129 in particular cover the disclosure requirements of many state
laws. Those sections require statement of the significant items of the credit transaction in
addition to simple interest disclosure.
78. CCPA § 123.
79. See UCCC §§ 2301 and 3301. The Federal Reserve Board has already, by letter of
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, been requested to find the UCCC substantially
similar to the CCPA. As yet, the Board has not acted.
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may be open to discussion. 0 Earlier works explored this idea more care-
fully;"' more recent ostensible quarrels with the concept of uniformity
turn out, upon inspection, to be really attacks upon the UCCC with
arguments against uniformity used merely as a make-weight.8 2
The Executive Director of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws has suggested five major reasons for uniformity:
1. "The most commonly advanced argument for uniformity is 'neces-
sity' in the economic or social sense" that law be uniform.
2. Of interest more in the British Commonwealth than the United
States "is the 'necessity' of maintaining symmetry or uniformity of
concept or theory of law."
3. A more "abstract variant" of the second argument is that there is
a proper solution, a theoretical "oughtness," to a problem; if it has
been found, like Durante's joke about the lost chord, why play
all those other notes?
4. Uniform laws, through the educative function of law, will tend to
promote uniformity in attitude and ethical conduct.
5. The United States federal system will be strengthened if states
adopt uniform legislation and inhibit entry of the federal govern-
ment into state affairs. s3
Executive Director Dunham's "necessity" point is not, of course, a
real argument supporting uniformity as a generally desirable objective.
The real issue exists on a case-by-case basis: is it necessary that this
area of law be uniform? As a sub-question one may also ask whether it
is necessary, or merely desirable, that uniformity exist? In consumer
credit legislation, it would be difficult to justify the necessity of uni-
formity since consumer credit exists now, with only relatively minor
abuses, and without uniformity. Certain statutes permit the perpetration
of practices that some might consider abusive.8 4 It is not, however, the
fault of these statutes that they vary from those of other states, but that
80. Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 233 (1965).
81. See 19 Mont. L. Rev. 149 (1958), which listed three objections to uniformity:
(1) It conjures up vistas of drabness and regimentation; (2) local situations may differ;
and (3) local legislation may already exist in the particular field. See also Greene, The Uni-
form Acts and Their New York Statutory Counterparts, 7 Syracuse L. Rev. 38 (1955).
82. See Newton & Pusateri, Consumer Credit Code: The Case for Model Laws vs. A
Single Umbrella Type Law, 18 Pers. Fin. L.Q. Rep. 112 (1964).
83. Dunham, supra note 80.
84. The views of the Louisiana Court of Appeals on that state's general interest law are
clearly expressed in Clasen v. Excel Fin. Causeway, Inc., 170 So. 2d 924 (La. Ct. App.
1965).
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some are deficient. Many state statutes differing widely among them-
selves support excellent state credit systems s5
Nevertheless, if uniformity in consumer credit is desirable-and in
balance I believe it is-the fact that it is not necessary is insufficient
reason to avoid it. "Desirability" rather than "necessity" does, however,
compel one to examine the factors opposing as well as those supporting
uniformity. What are the advantages of consumer credit operating under
a uniform code?
In this writer's judgment probably the single most significant ad-
vantage in uniformity relates to Executive Director Dunham's fourth
point: the increased likelihood that the nation will understand and com-
ply with the law. This factor obviously played an important part in the
drafting of the UCCC. Largely because of the existing varieties in state
law, not only among, but also within most individual states, there is no
valid consumer folklore, or instinctive understanding, of what one's
rights, benefits and problems are in obtaining credit. In large measure
this is also true of the small businessman. Whatever general under-
standing exists is largely inaccurate.
The "right" rate is an obvious example. There is almost no general
understanding of what is a proper price (or interest rate) to pay for
credit, as there is of a proper price for an automobile or a suit of clothes.
That rates of 20 or 30 percent per annum may legitimately be too low
to support various types of consumer credit, and that legitimate creditors
must charge these rates in order to enter certain areas of the credit
market, or possibly leave the potential consumer debtor to illegal lenders,
is to most consumers a startling revelation. Probably the credit industry
itself is principally responsible for this.8" The very process of writing the
UCCC has educated a wide group of consumer-oriented interests to the
real issues of interest rates.
As uniformity develops, we may reasonably expect both the ordinary
consumer and his legal representatives to increase their understanding of
this area of law. The importance of the latter group is not to be mini-
mized. Increasing attention is regularly being devoted to proper legal
representation of ordinary consumers in ordinary consumer transactions.
The major movement is now in the law schools and, to a somewhat lesser
85. The New York Small Loan Law, found in N.Y. Banking Law art. IX and the Cal.
Pers. Prop. Brokers Law (under which most consumer lending in California is conducted),
found in Cal. Fin. Code §§ 22000-653 (West 1968) differ markedly in principle. Entry
to the credit market is highly restricted by the former and is quite open under the latter.
Both states nevertheless have commendable credit systems.
86. See Felsenfeld, Consumer Interest Rates: A Public Learning Process, 23 Bus. Law.
931 (1968).
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degree, in government. Yet the bar itself is less expert in the ramifica-
tions of consumer finance than in far less widespread areas of activity.
One obvious reason for this is that fees for representing consumer
debtors are likely to be small. This latter cause is in the process of cor-
rection through state, federal, foundation, insurance and other means.87
To the extent that lawyers' inadequacy is the result of a totally unneces-
sary tangle of laws, uniformity must be advantageous. 88
In addition to this relatively specialized assistance to the bar, im-
portant uniform legislation is likely to stimulate journals of national
circulation, commentators and politicians of national scope, as well as
the fashions of national thought, to attend to the real issues of consumer
credit. Furthermore, as a result of uniformity, a debtor moving from
area to area will obviously be much better able than at present to utilize
his existing knowledge in his new circumstances.
It should be added that consumer mobility is not, in and of itself, a
compelling reason for uniformity. There is no essential necessity that a
New Jersey consumer be accorded the same treatment as a New Yorker.
Even if they are shoppers in the same New York store, it remains a
question whether, and not a truism that, there should be uniform treat-
ment. A local purchase or small loan by a consumer would appear on its
face to be a transaction peculiarly local in nature and subject to indi-
vidual state regulation with its inherent regard for local problems and
needs. Easy mobility does, however, tend to shift the burden of per-
suasion in testing the desirability of uniformity. Unless there is good
reason for differences, the peripatetic nature of the consuming public
would seem to recommend generally like treatment. Common sense, as
distinguished from legal sophistication, dictates that the same person be
accorded the same legal treatment for the same transaction, regardless
of the state within which it "legally" falls. This approach finds recep-
tivity with the lay public who may not have thought deeply into the
issues of the federal system and the needs of the separate states. State
variations in law are often derided by the public who, lacking the
lawyer's insight, are unable to see why usurious interest should be higher
than 8 percent in Maryland, 7/2 percent in New York and 12 percent
87. UCCC § 5.202, permits a court to award attorney's fees to a debtor in a suc-
cessful litigation. Some state statutes already provide this: e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 438.32 (1967) ; see Symposium: The War on Poverty, Legal Services and The Rural Poor,
15 Kan. L. Rev. 401 (1967); Stolz, Insurance for Legal Services: A Preliminary Study of
Feasibility, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 417 (1968).
88. Legal decisions in one state will also be of assistance in deciding related questions In
other states with the same uniform law. In re Halferty, 136 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1943);
Hutchinson v. Renner, 28 Ohio App. 22, 162 N.E. 451 (1928). See also Merrill, Uniformly
Correct Construction of Uniform Laws, 25 Mont. L. Rev. 97 (1963).
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in Connecticut. Put differently, it seems entirely probable that uni-
formity will increase the general respect for, and consequent observance
of the law.
An adjunct of consumer understanding of the law as a result of uni-
form legislation is that not only debtors but also creditors and public
officials will be more clearly able to apply the appropriate law to a given
transaction. We need not elaborate on the numerous and often subtle
conflicts-of-laws issues related to consumer credit. In many cases, credi-
tors simply do not know which jurisdiction to select from the two or
more affecting their transactions.8 9 Administrators entrusted with the
duty of overseeing the credit transactions and creditors subject to local
credit law face similar problems. Loans are often made by mail across
state lines; a debtor living in state X may obtain a loan in state Y
secured by real estate in state Z; credit cards operated through data
processing equipment in state Z may be issued nationally. The problems
multiply as the use of credit increases. In commercial-as distinguished
from consumer--credit, the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in 49
states,9 1 has already significantly reduced the conflicts-of-laws problems.
Although the CCPA will eventually solve many of these problems in
the area of credit cost disclosure,9' its immediate effect is likely to com-
plicate the issues. Prior to the CCPA, there was at most the problem
of observing state law. Until state law becomes uniform, however, state
variations will coexist with the CCPA, as an added factor. Since no state
disclosure statute is identical to the "CCPA, this aspect of the problem
will exist in all states with disclosure laws continuing in variance with
the CCPA as of July 1, 1969.92 As examples of the kind of confusion we
can foresee: Apparently in California one will have to express interest
rates both in terms of the state requirement of percent-per-month and as
simple annual interest under the CCPA.93 In Vermont, all consumer
transactions up to $25,000 will be subject to the Vermont disclosure laws
and the CCPA; business transactions within that limit will be subject
only to Vermont law.94 Presumably, if obtaining life insurance is re-
quired of the debtor, it would be considered the equivalent of a finance
89. Recent controls on advertising, which may affect several states through such media
as newspapers and radio, complicate this further. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-257 (Supp.
1968); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 255B, § 14A, ch. 255D, § 23 (Supp. 1968).
90. Louisiana has not adopted the UCC.
91. Notes 76-79 supra.
92. See Ky. Acts 1968, ch. 188, § 14(2), to the effect that it is Kentucky's intention to
comply with the CCPA in disclosure requirements.
93. See Cal. Fin. Code § 22454 (West 1968).
94. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 31(f) (Supp. 1968).
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charge under the CCPA, 5 but not under the Kentucky or Rhode Island
disclosure statutes. 6
Hopefully the potentiality of this kind of problem will cause the states
to become "uniformed" by the influence of the CCPA before its effective
date either through independently drafted legislation or adoption of the
UCCC. It seems possible that even total adoption of the UCCC will not
entirely end the problem. Under the UCCC's administrative provisions,
the state administrator has rule-making power. To the extent that rules
of individual states vary from the CCPA and the regulations under that
statute, 97 this sort of state-federal inconsistency will continue. However,
the UCCC contains an admonition to the state administration to try to
conform to federal law.98
A second major reason for uniformity in consumer credit legislation is
creditor convenience and simplicity of operation. This reason has also
strongly influenced the drafting of the UCCC. The provisions of the
UCCC dealing with territorial application-the conflicts of laws prob-
lems-clearly permit selection of a jurisdiction by the creditor in such
problem areas as the mail loan and the credit card which will greatly
reduce the conflicts problems. 9 We have noted the variety of statutes
that complicate the operations today of any large credit institution.
Clearly the number of pieces of paper that must be shuffled, and the
number of laws, regulations, interpretations and cases that must be
learned and kept current diminish markedly under federal or uniform
legislation. Simplicity of operation may also have an effect in reducing
the cost of credit, a cost that must ultimately be borne by the consumer.
An educated guess, however, is that this cost saving would be relatively
low when considered in relation to the total cost of credit. Another guess
is that this general creditor benefit from uniformity is not a sufficiently
attractive argument to be of significant influence to anyone but a large
creditor or his lawyer.
Executive Director Dunham gives as his third general reason for uni-
formity the policy that if the best legal solution to a problem is found it,
rather than solutions of lesser merit, should be adopted. Reasonable men
do differ on whether the UCCC is truly the best solution to the various
consumer and business credit problems it treats.100 This writer believes
95. CCPA § 106.
96. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 360.215(9), (13) (Supp. 1968); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 6-27-3(3)
(1968).
97. CCPA § 105.
98. UCCC § 6.104.
99. UCCC § 1.201.
100. See Denonn, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code Bombshell, 22 Pers. Fin. L.Q.
Rep. 125 (1968); Consumer Credit Administrators Oppose the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, 22 Pers. Fin. L.Q. Rep. 131 (1968).
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that the UCCC represents a substantial improvement over the present
system.
That this is so is not surprising. A project as significant as the drafting
of the UCCC, particularly during a period when the plight of the con-
sumer is a celebrated political issue, receives much attention from many
interested sources. The best available opinions from representatives of
the credit and merchandising industries as well as the views of numerous
consumer, governmental, labor and academic authorities were tendered
and carefully considered." 1 Through a prolonged process of argument,
sifting, elimination and adoption, the Commissioners developed a Code
that embodies the most enlightened views as yet synthesized into this
form of statute.
It is unlikely that any consumer credit problem of real moment was
missed by the Special Committee, its staff and advisers. It is more prob-
able that scores of useless and unnecessary issues were presented and
worried. In the protection of the poor and the downtrodden as well as
the wealthy and established field of commerce, banners, slogans, shib-
boleths and rhetoric often become sacred or odious far beyond their true
social or economic importance. Such displays as the creditors' impas-
sioned support of the waiver of defense clause,'1 2 the banks' fight against
sellers of goods being permitted to lend money1 3 and the consumers'
fight against deficiency judgments' are much more an honoring of
sacred cows than an attention to real issues.
Nevertheless, the ultimate result of this kind of attention is generally
intelligent and comprehensive legislation.10 5 This is in marked contrast
to much of the consumer legislation that has been written through the
years as a result of individual state action. Obviously, legislation pro-
posed for any given state will receive less widespread attention than
legislation slated for national enactment. It is, therefore, inherent in
state legislation that the views of influential local groups or individuals
will infect legislative efforts. 0 6 The chorus of voices in a major uniform
laws project minimizes the impact of any particular interest. While such
101. In addition to a distinguished group of Commis ioner drawn from the bench, the
bar and the universities, the drafting was assisted by Consultants, 20 General Advisors and
about 25 more Advisors who served on particular issues. Comments and suggestions were
also constantly received from any quarters affected by the UCCC.
102. A point on which no agreement could be reached. Alternatives appear at UCCC
§ 2.404.
103. uccc § 3.513.
104. UCCC § 5.103.
105. Sullivan, The Desirability of Uniformity Between State and Federal Laws on Food
Additives, 16 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 34 (1961).
106. E.g., RI. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 19 to 25-3-27 exempts loans of over $25,000 by
insurance companies from licensing requirements; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 6-27-10 exempts
loans for educational purposes from disclosure requirements.
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a group effort may tend to lower the peaks of the draftsmen's aspirations,
it also raises the valleys.
One unfortunate disadvantage of this widespread participation is the
development of many pockets of dissatisfaction from those whose views
were considered and rejected. There is no prominent interest in the field
of consumer credit whose toes have not been bruised in the UCCC project.
One major body has made its opposition official. 10 7 Others have let their
views be known informally. This will unquestionably have an adverse
effect upon the UCCC's ultimate treatment in the state legislatures, but
the potency of the disgruntled remains to be seen.
If the uniform law is the best law, its general adoption in a federal
system such as ours not only affords each individual enacting state its
benefits, but also eliminates the danger that the state system will be
used to undercut the law's effects. It is now relatively simple for a com-
pany of means to select a base, or "haven," with laws that it finds con-
genial. From this base, doctrines of interstate commerce, full faith and
credit and comity enable it to conduct credit operations with effect upon
residents of many other jurisdictions. The widespread use of credit cards
whose legal situs may be far from the points of actual use and direct
loans made through the mails are two obvious examples. This is not
necessarily an undesirable or a pernicious practice. It can result in a
healthy stimulus to competition for a consumer credit source to extend
beyond the reach of its immediate shopping area. It can also result in a
continuous testing of a state's legal system against those of its neighbors.
While credit extended by financial institutions to business or commercial
entities has become, as a result of increased communications, a com-
petitive market area of national scope, low balance consumer loans have
traditionally been restricted to potential borrowers within a few miles
of the loan source. This tradition is now weakening and national systems
of credit are increasingly made applicable to consumer as well as com-
mercial credit. The laws of one jurisdiction thus stand a growing risk
of being diluted by other, better or worse, laws elsewhere. Our point here
is that if one law is a "best" law, it is desirable that "worse" laws do not
invade its area or reduce its scope. Uniformity serves this end.
All the advantages of uniformity discussed thus far are equally ap-
plicable to a traditional uniform law, a federal law and state laws made
uniform by national stimulation. Executive Director Dunham's fifth
point, that uniformity can strengthen the states vis-h-vis Washington is
obviously directed solely at state legislation.
To the extent that the states have enacted constructive and uniform,
or relatively uniform, legislation on a topic of national interest, the
107. See articles cited note 100 supra.
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stimulus to federal entry into the field is obviously reduced. The major
substantive effect of a federal statute-one law throughout the land-
has simply been accomplished through state action. For those to whom
the continuing vitality of the states as against centralized federal au-
thority is significant, this is a worthwhile objective. To others it is not
a matter of importance so long as good laws are in force. As state ap-
pointed officials, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws accept the
tenet of states' rights as a matter of true concern;108 thus the UCCC was
drafted with the objective of state dominance much in mind.
We have noted the invitation in the CCPA that the states adopt com-
parable legislation and the acceptance of that invitation by the Com-
missioners. In addition, Title IV of the CCPA provides for a nine man
National Commission on Consumer Finance. Three will be Senators,
three Representatives and three from outside the federal government. '
This Commission is directed to "study and appraise the functioning and
structure of the consumer finance industry, as well as consumer credit
transactions generally."" 0 It is to make interim reports and a final report
to the President and to the Congress by January 1, 1971.
One can fairly assume that whatever legislative gaps or deficiencies
in consumer credit continue to exist on the state level will motivate this
Commission to recommend federal legislation expanding the scope of
the CCPA. Indeed, the very creation of this Commission has generally
been accepted as a warning that further federal legislation on consumer
credit is in the offing. To meet this threat, the Commissioners have been
further impelled to prepare a code that will do more than merely com-
plement the existing CCPA with "substantially similar" provisions. To
some measure the comprehensiveness of the UCCC is a direct effort to
reduce-the threat of increased federal intervention by making it unneces-
sary. Note should be taken of the fact that Congress' power to enact
consumer credit legislation is based upon its power to affect the economic
health of the country under the "general welfare" clause.' The local
nature of a consumer credit transaction cannot be relied upon to prevent
federal preemption as it might if interstate commerce were the consti-
tutional base.
Whether effective consumer credit control and regulation is truly more
effective at the state than the federal level is itself a fair question. Since,
almost exclusively, state control is the tradition, most representatives of
108. See President's Address to the Conference, Handbook of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 48 (1967).
109. Senators Sparkman, Proxmire and Brooke and Representatives Patman, Sullivan
and Dwyer have already been appointed.
110. CCPA § 404.
111. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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the credit industry are committed to retaining state dominance.1 1 2 The
existing pattern of licensing and examination, in which literally millions
of small individual transactions are surveyed by local officials, also sug-
gests an appropriate climate for local, rather than centralized, control.
Even within the general scheme of uniform legislation, there may be
reasons for varying practices within local areas when consumer transac-
tions are concerned. The plight of the consumer and the imagination of
the creditor are subject to sudden and unexpected turns which state
action is presumably better geared to meet than is the cumbersome
machinery of the federal government. Pockets of economic hardship,
fashions in creditor pressure or greed, vagaries of local procedural or
enforcement devices all tend toward some measure of decentralized con-
sumer debt supervision.
These arguments lack support in fact and tend to be the result of dis-
satisfaction more with other policies of the UCCC than with its appeal
for uniformity. 3 Indeed, despite industry's professions of admiration
for state control, the growing complexity of variegated state regulation
is also taking its toll." 4 Perhaps not surprisingly, a small, almost em-
barrassed, feeling seems to be developing among creditor groups that
the federal-unitary rather than the state-uniform (or uniformed) ap-
proach to credit regulation may actually be the better one. Among the
"realists," there is grudging acceptance of the fact that even those states
adopting the UCCC cannot be depended upon to receive it without
alteration." 5 Given the broad authority to draft regulations contained
in both the CCPA and the UCCC, it also seems probable that differences
will exist at least at the regulatory level. Ultimately it is not unreason-
able to expect that state distinctions will continue to exist, and, in any
given state, some varying state and federal requirements will control
credit transactions. The alternative, total federal supremacy, gradually
appears less frightening by comparison. It is still treasonous to suggest
this in industry circles, but a drift in that direction is discernible.
As one becomes involved in this issue of federal versus uniform state
law, some interesting similarities between them appear. Essentially, both
effect multi-state conformity to the same law. Oregon transactions may
be governed by the same laws as those occurring in Maryland either by
the states' voluntarily enacting those laws or falling subject to them
112. See Rolph, The Impact of Federal Simple Annual Rate Disclosure Legislation, 20
Pers. Fin. L.Q. Rep. 58 (1966).
113. Cf. note 82 supra.
114. See notes 92-96 supra, which illustrate the type of inherent problem.
115. Experience with the UCC in the state legislatures bears this out. Charlton, Tie
Non-Uniform Commercial Code, 3 Am. Bus. L.J. 269 (1966).
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under the umbrella of a federal statute. When the state laws are "uni-
formed" by the invitation or hortatory effect of the federal law, the
similarities are even greater.
To what extent has the state really retained its essential stateness
when the law it adopts is a mirror of a federal statute that would become
operative if the state has not taken action? If liberty has been volun-
tarily relinquished, or relinquished under pressure, it would seem to be
just as gone as if it were forcefully taken. However, each strong uniform
law, the UCCC being only one among many, to some degree strengthens
the state and diminishes the likelihood of federal intervention, not only
in the area of that law, but in all other areas constitutionally open to
federal power." 6 Uniformity, to this extent, stimulates the type of federal
system the United States was designed to be: a central government of
limited powers binding a group of states of broad residual powers.
Finally, under a uniform law the states do retain the power to depart
from uniformity. The benefits of the multi-state system are retained. If
the UCCC is found to be a disaster, it is not essential that the federal
government with its ponderous legislative machinery take action. The
relatively light-footed avenue of state action does continue to be avail-
able. While the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws will strongly
oppose individual state action" 7 (presumably until convinced of its neces-
sity), such action does remain as an advantage of state law, even uni-
form state law, over federal enactments.
IV. A CASE AGAINST UNIFORMTY
We have already indicated that uniformity is not an unmixed blessing.
While this observer firmly believes that the UCCC is a major advance
in the law of consumer credit and deserves to be uniformly adopted, he
also recognizes certain innate disadvantages in uniformity. Obviously
these should be appreciated by the advocates as well as the opponents
of uniform laws.
One disadvantage that exists more on a theoretical than an actual level
in the field of consumer credit is the possibility that different states, or
different areas of the country, require different credit laws because of
their intrinsic regional differences. The UCCC has been criticized on
this ground most frequently by those state officials presently empowered
to administer existing laws regulating consumer credit. Intimately con-
cerned with the problems of their own states and loyal to their states'
existing statutes, which they occasionally authored, they often contest
116. Nicholson, FTC at the Crossroads, 34 Ind. Banker 8 (Sept. 1968).
117. Report No. 2 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code
(1964).
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the premise that what is good for state X necessarily applies to state Y.
Indeed, the suggestion has been made that the UCCC prescribe only
general outlines and leave such details as rate structures to individual
state legislatures. This argument has, of course, been parroted by those
opposed to the UCCC on other grounds as well.
The argument has not been found convincing. While it is perfectly
clear that a low income, marginal borrower may require different rates
and different protections than his affluent neighbor, and, similarly, a loan
secured by real estate may require different considerations from a loan
secured by household furniture (the type of distinction recognized by
the UCCC), no convincing case has been made that a debtor in the
Northwest is different from one in the Southeast, consumer-creditwise.
Patterns of geography or industry that may dictate differing treatment of
riparian rights or zoning in Colorado and New York have not been proven
applicable to consumer debt." 8 In fact, to the best of my knowledge, not
enough evidence has even been introduced to support a prima facie case.
On the contrary, creditors have found the rates, type of security and
standards of credit-worthiness to be essentially the same throughout the
country. Vagaries of local law do require some refinement in credit prac-
tices from state to state. These are relatively minor, however, and the
differences among states are much more difficult to identify than are
the similarities. Moreover, credit practices now vary because of varia-
tions in state law; it is not the law that varies because of factors in-
digenous to local economy, climate or custom. Present credit patterns
throughout the state system are also affected by laws which themselves
do not specifically deal with credit. The ease with which confessions of
judgment (and resulting liens on real estate) may be obtained and the
effectiveness of wage assignments in a state affect the judgment of the
credit grantor operating in that state." 9 Laws permitting extensive ability
to reach a debtor's wages may tend to stimulate granting of credit in the
first instance. Simplified methods of garnishing wages either before or
after a judgment in a lawsuit also seem to stimulate the availability of
credit since collection is made easier. Over a longer term, however,
greater direct availability of wages to debt obligations has been found
to have a direct correlation with a state's bankruptcy rate. Apparently
this is an area of acute sensitivity, stimulating resort to the extreme
118. FTC Commissioner Nicholson specifically argues that in the type of disclosure re-
quired by the CCPA the individual states have no particular degree of expertise. Nichol-
son, supra note 116.
119. In Pennsylvania, for example, judgment may immediately be entered against an
obligor for an instrunent containing an appropriate provision to this effect. Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 12, § 739 (Supp. 1967).
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bankruptcy remedy. This may have the effect of restricting credit. 2
Unfortunately, the importance of these factors is extremely difficult to
measure. At best, one gets a credit "climate" in a state that is the result
of many interacting elements.
Regional differences in consumer credit laws will be eliminated largely
by the UCCC, and the CCPA will tend to eliminate variations in credit
disclosure requirements. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned factors which
touch on consumer credit indirectly exert an influence. If an objective
of uniformity is to treat all consumers alike, variations in these related
factors would seem to require a compensating variation in the uniform
law. Legal variations outside the uniform law should, ideally, be mini-
mized by adaptations in the uniform law to offset these effects. In other
words, any complex legal system is really, to some degree, an argument
against uniformity.
As it happens, many of these secondary factors (confessions of judg-
ment, wage assignments and garnishments, for example) will actually
be covered by the CCPA and the UCCC' -' and thereby made uniform.
Other local variations, among them procedural devices available to serve
process, prove a case and obtain and enforce judgment, calendar back-
logs, foreclosure devices and practices of collection agencies, will con-
tinue to present local variations that, ideally, should be compensated
for in the UCCC. The practicality of such compensation must, however,
be dismissed as too subtle and ephemeral for effective legal treatment;
differences do exist but they are not measurable and they do not really
represent a compelling argument against uniformity.
Probably the only telling contention against uniformity is that its prac-
tical effect is loss of one desirable element of state as distinguished from
federal law. It is a relatively simple matter to change an undesirable
state statute.12  Federal law takes on a more permanent quality. The
number of people who attend the formulation of federal law are enough
to slow its change. Furthermore, the number of people it affects is usually
sufficient reason to justify that pace. The enormity of the problems
that center around the federal government as well as the sensitive political
issues surrounding significant legislation and the general hooplah inherent
in federal activity all act as a drag on federal, as distinguished from
state, legislation. There are exceptions both on the state and federal
120. Brunn, Wage Garnishments in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53
Calif. L. Rev. 1214 (1965); Note, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study,
43 Wash. L. Rev. 743 (1968).
121. CCPA tit. IMl; UCCC §§ 2.410, 2.415, 3.403, 3.407, 5.103 and 5.104.
122. See Toll, Uniform State Laws, 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 450 (1954).
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levels, 123 but as a generalization it is fair. Unless a state statute has a
particular public appeal, or is a favorite of special interest groups, a state
legislature can usually act with a fair degree of ease and promptness to
correct, amend, patch, prune or repeal it entirely. If, however, the state
law is a "uniform" law, this may not be the case.
Enough people are concerned with each uniform law to make change a
matter of some moment. The National Conference of Commissioners,
dedicated to the concept of uniformity and primarily responsible for the
continuing protection of the uniform laws, keeps careful watch lest the
benefits of uniformity be lost through diverse state action. Those de-
voted to the concept of uniformity frankly espouse the advantages of
uniformity over scattered perfection. 4 It should be noted that changes
on a piecemeal basis will not only destroy the basic advantages of uni-
formity, but can have unexpected effects: A verbal clarification in one
state can well create a negative implication that a reverse meaning was
intended in another when in fact no such inference is warranted." The
traditional lawyer's rule, that the same words should be used when the
same meaning is intended and different words should be construed to
have different meanings, may well be inaccurate when a uniform law is
varied in an individual state.
We see this tendency toward stability at work in the current efforts to
revise the Uniform Commercial Code. Drafting lapses in the Code have
been admitted by its draftsmen. In addition, areas of ambiguity have
been found (or perhaps created) that might well be the subject of clari-
fication. The care and deliberation that produced the initial UCC, how-
ever, is equally present in the consideration of amendments . 2  To those
acquainted with the state legislative processes, this is not unknown, but
neither is it typical.
The effect is, in fact, reminiscent of federal legislation where change
may be equally deliberate. The presence of an issue on the national stage
occasions so much attention and stimulates so much comment that, in
123. It took eight years to get the UCC enacted in New York. See Reports of the Law
Revision Commission, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (1954-1956).
124. Schnader, The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code-Can
It Accomplish Its Object? 3 Am. Bus. L.J. 137 (1965); Henson, The Problem of Uni-
formity, 20 Bus. Law. 689 (1963).
125. This impelled the New York legislature to add, when making a piecemeal amend-
ment to New York's UCC § 1-209: "This section shall be construed as declaring the law
as it existed prior to the enactment of this section and not as modifying it."
126. On proposed changes in UCC article 9, see Kripke, Suggestions For Clarifying
Article 9: Intangibles, Proceeds, and Priorities, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 687 (1966); Henson,
Countersuggestions Regarding Article 9: A Reply to Professor Kripke, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 74
(1967); Weiss, Original Collateral and Proceeds: A Code Puzzle, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 78S
(1967).
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the search for a meeting ground among diverse interests, results are often
nigh impossible to achieve. This may well be appropriate for federal
legislation, since it necessarily affects 50 states and 200 million people.
The built-in friction protects us all. When the same safeguard is imposed
upon the states, albeit as a result of voluntary state action, it does create
something of a variation from the typical fluidity of individual state
action.
A noteworthy current example of this on the federal level in the field
of consumer credit is the continuing assault upon Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act dealing with Wage Earner's Plans. No one likes Chapter
XIII, but respected experts simply cannot reach sufficient agreement to
serve as a basis for remedial legislation. 127 If this were state rather than
federal law, an experiment here and there might teach us much. Mean-
while, the conflicting theories concerning Chapter XIII continue in con-
flict, but in abstraction, and little gets accomplished."e Even more to
the point is consumer credit disclosure itself. While Senator Douglas and
now Senator Proxmire have labored for years to achieve the simplest
form of disclosure on the national level, Senator Douglas having intro-
duced the first truth in lending bill in 1960, Connecticut, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia
and Washington achieved comparable results for their states with in-
finitely greater ease.
The UCCC, despite all the learning that it represents, does represent
something of a social experiment. Accumulated learning about consumer
credit has afforded ample support for its concepts, but gaps in our under-
standing of the consumer's credit problems still exist. It seems to some
that the consumer's true purchasing problems are only tangentially those
of credit.'2 Arguments have been made against stabilizing the UCCC
with a "uniform" label and perhaps merely designating it a "model"
127. Countryman, Proposed New Amendments for Chapter XII, 22 Bus. Law. 1151
(1967); Cowans, Present Bankruptcy Act Defective, 22 Pers. Fin. L.Q. Rep. 40 (1968);
Twinem, Reduce Unnecessary Personal Bankruptcies: Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 23
Legal Aid Brief Case 252 (1965); Comment, The Problem of Consumer Bankruptcy: Is
Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act the Answer?, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1449 (1965). See also
SJ. Res. 100, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967), To create a commission to study the bank-
ruptcy laws of the United States.
128. For the American Bar Association position on Chapter XIII, see Corporation
Section, ABA, Approves New Proposals to Encourage Use of Chapter XIII, 22 Pers. Fin.
L.Q. Rep. 135 (1968). 0
129. Credit in the ghetto areas is discussed in the Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders at 139-41 (1968). It is perfectly clear from this summary
report that the most fundamental problems of credit are not the sort that are affected by
laws of the type of the CCPA or the UCCC.
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statute.130 The traditional state processes, that is separate, individually
conceived state legislation, and experimentation with consumer credit
statutes, clearly would have added to our knowledge about consumer
credit. Perhaps, some years from now, the results of a period of trial and
error may produce a better statute than the UCCC.
In the final analysis, that kind of argument could in varying degrees
be made against any legislation at any time. The Commissioners, their
Consultants, Advisors and the scores who cooperated in the preparation
of the UCCC were no strangers to consumer credit. There was no
shortage of information and experience available to guide the draftsmen,
and the need for new and coherent legislation is obvious. Moreover, no
major legislative innovation is likely to be entirely free of disadvantages.
It is submitted that disadvantages in the UCCC or in the overall concept
of uniformity are relatively insignificant when compared to the benefits.
The remainder of this article will be primarily devoted to a consideration
of those benefits.
V. PRINCIPLES OF THE CCPA AND THE UCCC
Certain basic principles form the foundation upon which the UCCC
is constructed. Some of these are also reflected in the CCPA. To the
extent that the two acts overlap, they are consistent in approach and
largely duplicate the work of the other. The only substantive portion
of the CCPA that does not have a counterpart in the UCCC is Title II,
Extortionate Credit Transactions, and in no real sense can Title II be
considered an outgrowth of any essential policy toward consumer credit.
It is rather a specialized application of accepted criminal law concepts
to the extension of credit, which is quite probably unnecessary in most
areas in view of existing criminal laws dealing with crimes of violence.
In any case, it is not a fundamental part of the CCPA, has no reflection
in the UCCC, and will not be treated here.
Obviously, the CCPA and particularly the UCCC contain numerous
detailed provisions that could profitably receive our attention. Un-
doubtedly, many which we shall ignore are deemed by some to represent
basic "policy." In terms of the entirety of the two acts, however, and
why they were written much as they are, there seem to be four basic
propositions that guide the whole: (1) the unity of all types of consumer
credit, (2) the diminished need for rate control, (3) freedom of entry
into She consumer credit market, and (4) disclosure. Actually, the UCCC
130. A "model" statute may be proposed where "in the judgment of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws it is not a subject upon which uniformity
between the states is necessary or desirable, but where it would be helpful to have legisla-
tion which would tend toward uniformity where enacted . . . ." 1 U.L.A. at VI (1950).
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deals with all of these, while the CCPA is based only upon (1) and (4).
We shall consider them in order.
1. Consumer Credit Unity. As we have already seen, a sale on time
has traditionally been deemed a different sort of legal beast from a direct
loan of money. Different statutes have been designed for the two forms
of credit transaction; where no statute existed (particularly for time
sales), different controlling legal theories were devised. The reasons for
this are understandable only in a historic context. While both forms of
transaction have their roots in religious dogma, sales on time, free of
usury restrictions, became accepted as part of a general freeing of trade
in the course of the "rise of capitalism."' 131 Loans were much more strictly
bound to precise canon law and the sin of usury. 32 It was, of course,
availability of the "time price doctrine" that permitted credit to become
available on a mass basis as "sale" rather than "loan" transactions, and,
therefore, not subject to usury limitations and sanctions. As laws become
appropriate to control, or more clearly permit, these "time sales," those
laws also were framed so as to cover sales, not loans.
Similarly, as the usury laws became more obviously insufficient for
modem consumer "loan" credit, they too were revised. They stayed,
however, as loan laws and flowed down a different, although parallel,
stream from the sales laws.33 If we may summarize the movement of
both, it was to enable credit to be extended for both sales and loans at
rates high enough, but subject to sufficient control, to reach but not
victimize a mass consumer market.
It should be fairly evident that one who borrows $3,000 to buy a car
is not significantly different from one who buys a $3,000 car on time.
While cash loans are not regularly made in the low balances of typical
small consumer purchases (i.e., $3.98), an accumulation of these time
sale bills is one of the strongest reasons for borrowing money. Again,
the borrower does not significantly vary from the buyer. While some
statutes do recognize this fact and treat loans and sales much alike for
many purposes,3 4 this is not typical.
The draftsmen of both the UCCC and the CCPA had no trouble per-
ceiving the essential identity of the two transactional forms35 and ap-
preciating the historical, rather than logical, reasons for their separation.
131. R. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (2d ed. 1937).
132. See 21 Ark. L. Rev. & Bar Ass'n J. 224 (1967).
133. Barrett, The Consumer Finance Company, 23 Legal Aid Brief Case 272 (1965).
134. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-83 (Supp. 1968) considers a "retail instalment sale" to
include a loan contract for the purpose of buying goods. A like provison appears in La.
Rev. Stat. § 6:951 (Supp. 1967).
135. Johnson, Economic Rationale of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23 J. Fin.
303 (1968).
1968]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Actually, a number of the UCCC draftsmen (not so those closest to
preparation of the CCPA) had written substantial portions of the secured
transactions article of the Uniform Commercial Code.1 30 They had al-
ready seen that the conditional sale contract, the historic device to evi-
dence a secured time sale, and the chattel mortgage, the traditional loan
security device, were legal anachronisms and had replaced them with the
"security interest."'137 It originally seemed fairly obvious that consumer
credit needed an analogous simplification and the creation of, perhaps,
a "consumer credit transaction." This turned out to be impracticable for
two reasons.
First, the substantial creditor body, both retail merchants and those
who financed their paper, were still in large measure reliant upon the
time price doctrine. This was so not only in the areas that continued
unregulated by specific retail instalment sale legislation, but under that
legislation too. Since the regulatory laws were generally drafted to cover
Csales," it was deemed by many a matter of some moment that the
retail time sales continue, clearly and indisputably, to be found to be
sales and not the type of forebearance of withholding 8 " that might
find them subject to a usury statute. The argument ran that if they were
considered the equivalent of loans under the UCCC (which in itself
might be all right), they might, by analogy, be held the equivalent of
loans in states without the UCCC (which was definitely not all right).
While the logic of this concern does not bear overly close scrutiny (since
the retail instalment statutes were designed specifically to keep time
sales from being deemed loans), the economic power of those disturbed
by it was easily sufficient to prevent a simple combination of all consumer
credit.
Second, and of fully equal persuasiveness, was the demand of the
retail merchant group that they be held separate from the lenders for
reasons of licensing and administration. It is traditional, again for his-
toric reasons, that lenders of money be licensed and highly regulated.
The lending community fully expected the UCCC to continue this tradi-
tion, although it looked for a while as if it might not.' 38 Credit sellers
(which include almost all merchants) are generally not licensed or regu-
136. Of the ten Commissioners who formed the Special Committee to draft the UCCC,
three (Messrs. Braucher, Malcolm, and Richter) had actively participated in drafting the
UCC. In addition, one Consultant to the Special Committee (Prof. Kripke) had also been
part of the UCC group.
137. UCC 9-102(2).
138. A typical usury law covers more than straightforward "loans." See N.Y. Gen. Ob-
ligations Law § 5-501 (Supp. 1968).
139. Jordan & Warren, supra note 5, at 430.
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lated, circumstances the merchants obviously did not want to change.
Thus, they did not wish to be lumped with the lenders.
Forced by the demand to keep lenders and sellers separate, the drafts-
men of the UCCC struggled with the appropriate degree of division. A
number of approaches were discussed, including the possibility of two
separate uniform acts, one for loans and the other for sales. Happily, this
was discarded in favor of the ultimate approach: one act broad enough
to cover all consumer credit transactions, thereby recognizing their es-
sential unity, a unity which is reflected throughout the UCCC, but at
the same time retaining the distinctions deemed important between sales
and loans.
Thus, the UCCC devotes Article 2 to "Credit Sales" and Article 3 to
"Loans." The remaining articles deal generally with credit transactions
and with creditors and debtors, thereby reducing to the necessary mini-
mum the continuing distinction between sales and loans.140 An unfortu-
nate but necessary result of this form of treatment is that, because sales
and loans are deemed so alike and, at the same time kept separate,
Articles 2 and 3 in large measure duplicate each other. A glance at the
section headings of the two articles leaves the uninitiated in wonderment
as to why they appear separately. Rates, disclosures, advertising and
many other matters are practically duplicated in the two articles, with
the word "sale" changed to "loan," along with whatever other technical
changes are required. Of course, some particularities do appear in one
or another of the articles: issues concerning the waiver of defense clause
have no application to loan transactions;' licensing has no application
to sales.14
The CCPA is somewhat more direct in its unification of sales and
loans. Most provisions of the CCPA are applicable to "consumer credit
transactions," an undefined term, but clearly through its use of the word
"credit" including both sales and loans .14 As with the UCCC, the CCPA
also makes distinctions between sales and loans. The CCPA distinctions
were made, however, entirely for functional reasons and not because of
special pressure group influence. Thus, the disclosure requirements of the
CCPA segregate sales and loans' (loans can't have a cash price or a
downpayment); Title II ("Extortionate Credit Transactions") deals
with loans rather than sales because that is the area of abuse.
140. The UCCC also deals with consumer leases, but for simplicity, that category of
credit transaction is not considered in this article.
141. UCCC § 2.404.
142. UCCC § 3.503.
143. CCPA § 103(e).
144. CCPA §§ 128, 129.
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To the extent that state law will become "uniformed" by the CCPA
invitation to enact substantially similar laws and thereby displace the
CCPA, it would appear that some measure of distinction between sales
and loans will continue as a CCPA compulsion. Since the CCPA itself
honors the distinctions in its disclosure sections, the only way states can
at this time have any reasonable assurance that their legislation will be
substantially similar is to retain the sale-loan distinction already in the
CCPA.
2. Reduced Rate Control. As we shall soon see, policies concerning
(2) reduced rate control, (3) freedom of entry and (4) disclosure, are
interdependent so that without any one of them the others would largely
fail of their purposes. This interdependency became increasingly ap-
parent during the UCCC drafting process until, in the latest stages, it
was almost impossible to make fundamental changes without requiring a
redraft of the entire act. For this reason, the burden of persuasion upon
those who desired revisions in the UCCC became increasingly heavy as
the drafting progressed; significant changes towards the end were almost
out of the question.
To the extent that the UCCC expresses an economic point of view on
the quantity of consumer credit, it is essentially that wide-spread credit
is desirable and should be made available in maximum supply by non-
governmental financial sources. While any creditor control will in some
degree have a restrictive effect, the UCCC expresses as one of "its under-
lying purposes and policies ... to assure an adequate supply of credit to
consumers."
M 45
The rate ceilings of the UCCC1 46 are, therefore, set high enough so
that credit can be extended, or money loaned, to every significant eco-
nomic group for every existing significant economic purpose, with a
satisfactory return to the existing forms of credit institutions. In specific
terms, this means that both loans and sales are permitted at finance
charge rates as high as 36 percent per year for credits of $300 or less
and at reducing rates that approach 18 percent as balances increase."'
Seller revolving charge accounts are subject to a 24 percent ceiling for
amounts of $500 or less and 18 percent above $500.1 As we shall dis-
145. UCCC § 1.102(2).
146. The CCPA requires a disclosure of rates, but it does not set ceiling rates. The House
of Representatives version of the CCPA did set an interest ceiling, H. Res. 11601, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) but this was dropped in Conference. H.R. Rep. No. 1397, 90th Cong.,
2d Seas. (1968).
147. UCCC §§ 2.201, 3.508. The loan category, however, requires licensing, as shall be
discussed.
148. UCCC § 2.207.
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cuss, some but not all credit institutions are subject to licensing require-
ments.
Whether or not these rates are "high" is more an emotional and politi-
cal question than a social or economic one. It is not the purpose of the
UCCC that most consumer credit will actually be extended at these
rates. The UCCC object is to set ceiling rates which will permit an ade-
quate supply of credit but, at the same time, to bring other factors to
bear upon those rates that will press rates actually in use well below the
ceilings. We now have sufficient experience to demonstrate that, given
policies concerning (3) freedom of entry and (4) disclosure, rates should
resolve at levels below the maxima of the UCCC'14 0-except in specific
areas of consumer credit where those maxima are economically neces-
sary.150
Indeed, even these UCCC ceiling rates are neither new nor startling
to representatives of the finance industry or to representatives of the
major consumer groups who have grown sophisticated in the needs of
the credit market-place.' 5 ' Many controversies existed, and exist today,
concerning the provisions of the UCCC but there was no major con-
troversy on the level of rate ceilings. There is no question but that mass
consumer credit, with its expenses of operation and credit losses, re-
quires a rate of charge that has no particular reference to the historic
six percent. There was, in fact, an early feeling that there should be no
rate ceilings whatever in the UCCC and that the actions of a free
marketplace should determine actual rates; this was deemed too revolu-
tionary to be politically palatable and was dropped. 52 When the interest
rates were pretty well agreed upon, it was felt by some that the rate
149. Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Instalment Credit, 66 Mlich.
L. Rev. 81 (1967). This excellent study of finance charge regulation indicates that in many
areas of consumer credit, competition has forced rates well below statutory ceilings.
150. Conclusive figures are extremely difficult to obtain as to what precise rate is neces-
sary for what type and dollar amount of credit. One reason for this is that the loan "mix"
of different creditors varies and figures applicable to a portfolio of large loans to farmers
have little application to a portfolio consisting principally of small loans to urban residents.
There are many who are convinced that even the 36 percent rate of the UCCC cannot
support credit in the low balance areas to which it applies without a mix of other credits
in higher amounts.
151. See statements of Roger S. Barrett and David I. Fand in the Discussion, Toward
a Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23 J. Fin. 320, 322 (1968); Benfield, Money, Mortgages
and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 819 (1968).
152. Actually it is not as revolutionary as it appears at first glance. Neither Canada nor
England has a usury law in the American sense. Ziegel, Consumer Credit Regulation: A
Canadian Consumer-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 488, 495 (1968). Also, some
of the New England states have no usury law above the small loan law ceilings. We should
also not forget the widespread exemption of corporations from American usury laws.
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should be expressed by the UCCC in a form other than simple interest,
as found in most existing statutes,'15 3 in order to sugar-coat the medicine
and also because some other rate forms are easier to apply than simple
annual interest.154 This was rejected as unworthy of the generally
straightforward approach of the UCCC. The simple interest rate ceilings
of the UCCC were finally adopted with the hope that the public and its
representatives could be educated, or at least persuaded, in the realities
of consumer credit.
In the last analysis, the rate ceilings of the UCCC are not ceilings in
the traditional sense of the usury laws or even of the more enlightened
small loan laws. The former were essentially variations of laws, both
lay and canon, that forbade interest entirely and reflected a grudging,
paternalistic attitude of the society toward credit. The latter were in-
tended to broaden the scope of legal consumer credit, but were still re-
strictive in terms of their approach to the lending field. Lenders of
money were deemed somehow analogous to public utilities, banks, air-
lines or securities exchanges. In such fields, the judgment of regulatory
authorities is substituted for what in less regulated fields is considered
the province of executive decision. 5 In consumer lending, entry into
the field and the power to set price (lending is, after all, only the sale of
credit for a price) was more circumscribed than in other consumer service
fields. Largely because of the limitations placed by the small loan laws
on those who could enter the lending field, the legal ceiling rates tended
to become the rates in actual use. The UCCC object is to replace this
pattern with one resembling more closely the type of distribution system
familiar to general sales of goods and services.
3. Freedom of Entry. If the rates set by the UCCC are truly to be
maximum and not actual rates it must be because of competition among
sources of credit supply for debtors' business. For this reason, the
UCCC proposes a mode of entry into the consumer credit market of
extremely liberal character. Essentially, two types of restriction in exist-
ing credit laws are eliminated by the UCCC.
First is the notorious "convenience and advantage" requirement, or
C & A as it is generally known. Existing state small loans laws require
that a lender be licensed before he may engage in the business of making
consumer loans at rates above the state's general interest levels. Most
of these laws contain an additional provision that the license will not be
issued unless it "will promote the convenience and advantage of the
153. Cf. notes 26-39 supra.
154. R. Johnson, Methods of Stating Consumer Finance Charges ch. 4 (1961).
155. Jones, "Legal Regulation and Economic Analysis," in Law in a Changing America
75 (G. Hazard, Jr. ed. 1968).
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community" in which the licensed office is to be located.50 This pro-
vision typically requires an elaborate presentation of economic data by
an applicant and affords state administrators an opportunity, one which
is enthusiastically taken, to restrict the number of licensed lenders in
the state.
It should be noted that this type of restrictive provision has been
applied only to lenders and not to sellers on credit or to finance companies
which purchase or discount their sales. The reason for this distinction
is largely anachronistic: borrowers were generally regarded as neces-
sitous, requiring special protections not applicable to buyers of goods
who could refrain from making the purchases; but, the distinction is a
vital part of the law of consumer credit.
The UCCC does require that lenders be licensed when they lend at
rates above 18 percent per annum.' 5 The historical distinction has been
observed and sellers on credit need not be licensed. To obtain a license,
an applicant must prove such unobjectionable matters as "financial re-
sponsibility, character and fitness," and satisfy the Administrator that
its officers and directors are "such as to warrant belief that the business
will be operated honestly and fairly within the purposes of this Act.""t~
It is anticipated that honest and responsible lenders will be able to obtain
licenses under these requirements and that licensing will not be used by
state administrators as a method of limiting the supply of credit to the
consumer market and thereby restricting competition.
The second restriction common in existing loan statutes that is elim-
inated by the UCCC is the traditional "dual business" requirement
which, under many loan laws, requires a state official to approve any
other business that may be conducted on the same premises as a loan
business. This form of requirement is based upon an old and vicious
practice which involved lenders requiring a borrower to purchase some
commodity at a highly inflated price in order to obtain a loan. The effect
of this would be to enable the lender to charge a legal rate of interest for
the loan, but indirectly collect a usurious charge in the inflated price of
the goods. The limited dual-business requirement is, however, an exam-
ple of legislative "over-kill" since an alternate type of restriction adopted
in many states and by the UCCC does the job more sensibly. This would
permit the operation of another business on loan premises unless that
other business is carried on "for the purpose of evasion or violation" of
156. See, e.g., N.Y. Banking Law § 343 (Supp. 1968).
157. UCCC § 3.502. This is to be distinguished from those who lend above 10 percent,
the UCCC category of "Regulated Lender." UCCC § 3-501. Regulated Lenders are subject
to varying forms of control, but not licensing.
158. UCCC § 3.503(2).
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the controlling statute.'5 9 Its adoption in the UCCC, however, is the
principal reason for much of the existing opposition.
With the elimination of both C & A and dual-business restrictions,
any reputable person can enter the loan field on any premises. This is
precisely what the draftsmen of the UCCC intended, and the Reporters-
Draftsmen reflected the views of the Commissioners' Special Committee
on the UCCC when they wrote: "There is no apparent reason why com-
petitive forces in a free market cannot be relied on to produce efficient
firms which will serve the public interest."'160 Nevertheless, many who
find their abilities to expand limited due to special legislation outside the
UCCC (the restrictions on branch banking being the dominant example),
and those for whom C & A has already created a quasi-monopolistic
position are in violent opposition to the UCCC because of its licensing
position. That position is based upon the belief that the most direct and
efficient way to obtain the maximum amount of credit at the lowest rates
is to set the rate ceilings high enough to permit credit and open competi-
tion enough to force rates down. No one really believes, however, that the
banking industry will be hurt by the UCCC; pushed, yes, but hurt, no.
Its unique situation in utilizing depositors' money for loan purposes
creates an enormous competitive advantage over those who can take
advantage of the UCCC licensing requirements but must raise capital
in much more expensive ways. It was resolved at a fairly early point
in drafting the UCCC that freedom of market entry was a cornerstone
of the statutory scheme. The many efforts to shake the draftsmen from
this position were too clearly related to self-interest to cause a change
in this policy.
4. Rate Disclosure. Another interconnected facet of the UCCC ap-
proach to rates and competition is the requirement that the consumer
know, in a manner that will permit him to compare, what are his credit
costs. The comparisons that the CCPA and the UCCC are designed to
enable the consumer to make are of two sorts: first a comparison be-
tween the utility of using credit or cash (sometimes called the "de-
scription" function); and a comparison between different forms of
credit (the "shopping" function). 6 ' To assist in making these compari-
sons, it is generally required by both Acts that finance charges be
expressed in simple annual interest, figured by the actuarial method, 10 "
and in terms of the actual dollar cost to the consumer.
While the public attention has generally been directed to the annual
159. UCCC § 3.513.
160. Jordan & Warren, supra note 5, at 432.
161. Johnson, supra note 135. See also Jordan & Warren, supra note 69.
162. CCPA § 107; UCCC § 1.301(17).
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interest percentage issue, the importance of also stating dollar cost should
not be overlooked. One can budget and evaluate in terms of his own
income a finance charge of $11.33 per month; this cannot be done with
9 percent. Indeed, for certain transactions, disclosure of a percentage
rate can itself be misleading. For example, purchase of a $6 item with
a $.50 charge for one month's credit may be entirely reasonable in view
of the low dollar amount, seller's handling costs and buyer's convenience.
Disclosure of a 100 percent interest charge, which is what it is, may
actually be a confusing and unnecessary element in the consumer's credit
evaluations. For this reason, where the finance charge does not exceed
$5 when the amount financed does not exceed $75, or $7.50 when the
amount financed exceeds $75, disclosure of the finance charge per-
centage rate is not required under the CCPA or the UCCC, although the
dollar cost must be stated.'3
Similarly, the disclosure of the dollar cost, as contrasted with the per-
centage rate, may be misleading in other transactions. In a long-term
real estate mortgage, for example, disclosure of dollars, as if they were
existing dollars, that must be paid many years in the future takes no
account of the discount that should be taken off those dollars to give
them a realistic present value. It is much more significant to the
mortgagor what his percentage rate is than what are the number of
dollars he will be paying ten to twenty years hence. For this reason,
purchase-money transactions in real estate are exempted from the
dollar disclosure requirements of the CCPA, and, when the rate does not
exceed 10 percent, the UCCC. 6 *
I am inclined to agree with Professor Kripke °'0 that the simple in-
terest disclosure battle is a good deal more smoke than fire. Professor
Kripke has pointed out that the process of competition has already
sorted out borrowers and sent those with better credit standing to the
credit sources with lower rates. It is also true that disclosure will not
help those in the most needy position, those who under our prevailing
credit system must pay the highest rates. Disclosure of lower rates to
this marginal group will not make lower rates available to them. In addi-
tion, this observer's personal experience in Connecticut and Massachu-
setts, where simple interest disclosure has been a reality for some
months, has indicated no variation whatever in the credit pattern.
But time may still be too short in Connecticut and lassachusetts.
The opinion expressed earlier that the greatest single advantage of uni-
163. CCPA §§ 128(a) (7), 129(a) (5); UCCC §§ 2.306(2), 3.306(2).
164. CCPA §§ 128(a)(6), 129(a)(4); §§ 2.306(2), 3.306(2).
165. Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oricnted Viecwpoint, 68 Colum.
L. Rev. 445, 460 (1968).
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formity is deeper understanding, may have an ultimate effect in stimu-
lating choice among alternate sources of credit. It seems probable,
however, that the real stimulation is going to start with creditors' ad-
vertising firms. While no movement along these lines is yet evident, it
is reasonable to expect that where all are required to state a percentage
figure, someone is going to start publicizing that his rate is lower than
his competitors'. Rate competition does exist in consumer credit, but its
possibilities and effects have barely been tapped. One may reasonably
expect that the simple interest disclosure requirement will accelerate this
form of competition and certainly assist in achieving the ultimate effects
anticipated by the UCCC and CCPA draftsmen.
VI. CONCLUSION
The CCPA and the UCCC represent a turning point. Consumer credit
of the future will be broader in legal scope, free of most of the traditional
restrictions associated with dated "sale" or "loan" concepts. It will be
less restricted geographically and subject to either federal or uniform
state laws, the ultimate effect of either being much the same. It will be
driven by those laws into a competitive marketplace where competing
sources of credit will become available to a better informed consumer.
The two statutes are harmonious and, while the UCCC encompasses
much more than the CCPA, both reflect these objectives. There is no
coherent objective in existing consumer credit statutes, and their patch-
work quilt character now makes corrective legislation a matter of some
moment. Both the UCCC and the CCPA were prepared with care by a
diverse group both concerned and expert in the needs of the consumer
and the credit industry. Taken together, which really means taking the
-UCCC since it will substantially supplant the CCPA, they represent by
a wide margin the best regulatory approach yet taken to the field of
consumer credit.
A major innovation of this sort cannot be without its disadvantages.
They are, however, significantly overbalanced by the benefits to be de-
rived. Naturally, the adverse aspects of the legislation will be empha-
sized by those who see personal positions of dominance, obtained under
prior law, threatened by the change. It is hoped that this will not unduly
impede the progress of this modern, constructive legislation.
